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1. Introduction 
Functionalist theories of conscious experience identify experiences as states which have a 
certain type of functional role. This identification entails, firstly, the 
Functional sufficiency thesis about experience (FSTE): having a state with a certain type of 
functional role is sufficient for having a conscious experience of a certain type, 
and secondly, the 
Functional necessity thesis about experience (FNTE): having a state with a certain type of 
functional role is necessary for having a conscious experience of a certain type. 
Each thesis can be formulated with logical or nomological force. My concern is with the FNTE’s 
nomological version (the falsity of which entails the falsity of any stronger version). Henceforth, 
by ‘the FNTE’ and ‘the FSTE’ I refer to the nomological versions. 
The FNTE gets cashed out as a requirement that each type of experience entails certain 
behavioral, cognitive or affective dispositions. For example, being in pain might entail 
dispositions to grimace, to desire relief, and to be grumpy. 
The FNTE is at least as central to functionalist theories as is the FSTE. But it is also more 
widely held than the FSTE, for it is enforced not just by overtly functionalist theories (e.g., Van 
Gulick 1993). Many theories, such as Rey (1997), reject the FSTE by placing further conditions 
on experience, yet retain the FNTE. Most representational theories of experience, whether first-
order or higher-order, give dispositions a necessary role. Thus Michael Tye (1995, 2000) holds 
that experiences are necessarily disposed (as he says, ‘poised’) to affect beliefs and desires. Also 
committed to the FNTE is Peter Carruthers’ higher-order theory (2000; 2005), on which 
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conscious experiences are disposed to cause higher-order thoughts about themselves; see also 
Van Gulick (2004). In general, any representational theory that relies on a functional role (or 
‘consumer’) semantics to individuate experiences will embrace the FNTE. 
Yet while the FSTE has received wide critical attention, the FNTE remains largely under the 
radar. As illustration, consider Janet Levin’s entry on functionalism in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. She mentions anti-FNTE arguments only very briefly, in a section titled ‘Inverted 
and Absent Qualia’, which – as that title itself suggests – focuses on anti-FSTE arguments like 
Block’s (1978) ‘Chinese nation’. Regarding anti-FNTE arguments, Levin merely remarks that it 
has been argued that ‘people may have mild, but distinctive, twinges that have no typical causes 
or characteristic effects’ (2010, §5.5.1, ¶2). 
I do not mean to pick on Levin, however. Her limited coverage of the FNTE merely reflects 
the state of the literature. 
I shall present an argument against the FNTE. More precisely, I shall present the argument’s 
second half. Its first half was convincingly presented by Michael Antony (1994), in a paper 
which, like anti-FNTE arguments in general, has been sadly ignored. His presentation of the 
argument’s second half, however, is unconvincing. I intend to fill this gap. 
Let me explain. Suppose a theory of conscious experience says that functional state F is 
necessary for an experience E. An anti-FNTE argument will describe a system that lacks F but 
still has E. The argument thus has two stages: the first describes conditions under which the 
system lacks F, and the second argues that under those conditions the system still has E. 
One can run this sort of argument in the way noted by Levin (2010), by arguing that some 
experiences simply lack a proprietary functional role. But such an approach is unconvincing (as 
is perhaps indicated by Levin’s lack of elaboration). The argument I am pursuing aims for a 
larger goal: that no functional role is necessary for any experience. 
Antony (1994; all citations of Antony will be to this paper) describes a manipulation of the 
brain of a subject who is (at least to begin with) in pain. The manipulation is designed to cause 
the brain state that is realizing the pain experience to lose its functional role. This is the first 
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stage of the anti-FNTE argument. Antony spends most of his time defending this stage. His 
defense is compelling, and I hope readers will forgive me for not repeating his discussion in any 
depth. Antony’s defense of the argument’s second stage, however, is brief and (in my view) 
weak. I shall give a new defense of the second stage. This is, I think, a worthwhile endeavor. As 
I have indicated, a number of theories of conscious experience would be placed in serious 
jeopardy if the anti-FNTE argument that he constructed could be made sound. 
Here is the plan. §2 recaps the case on which Antony builds his argument. Again, I will not 
spend much time repeating his defense of the argument’s first stage. I will, however, outline his 
very brief defense of the second stage, and explain its inadequacy. §3 introduces a principle that 
is central to my own defense of the second stage. In §4 I modify Antony’s case so that my 
principle will apply to it. In §5 I formulate my argument, and §6 defends its key premise. 
 
2. Antony’s argument: the case of Sam 
Antony imagines a person, Sam, who starts to experience pain at time t1, when his brain’s 
‘pain region’, which for brevity I shall call pS, goes into an active state that I shall call φ. (The 
shorthand terms are mine, not Antony’s.) 
The FNTE entails that φ realizes pain in virtue of its causal relations to other brain states, 
which underpin Sam’s pain-related dispositions. Thus φ is disposed to cause activity in other 
regions of his brain; for example, in the region responsible for action planning, so that Sam 
devises a plan for obtaining pain relief (say, by finding some aspirin). I shall call the action-
planning region aS. State φ of pS, then, realizes pain partly in virtue of its disposition to activate 
aS. Antony’s case now goes as follows (I insert my terminology in brackets): 
Imagine that there exists some impressive technology by means of which one can instantly 
incapacitate (or destroy) any region of an individual’s brain one chooses, right down to components of 
individual cells. That done, imagine… that activity [state φ] in Sam’s pain region [pS] has begun at t1, 
and that the signal is traveling toward the action-planning region [aS] but thus far has reached only the 
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half-way point along the connecting neural pathways. Call the time at which the signal reaches the 
half-way mark ‘t2’. Now assume that Sam’s pain region [pS] has been activated since t1, and that it 
remains activated at t2. Suppose, finally, that at t2 the action-planning region of Sam’s brain [aS] is 
incapacitated with our imaginary technological wonder. (p. 107) 
As of t2, then, Sam cannot formulate a plan to get aspirin, or indeed any plan at all. So, says 
Antony, φ ‘no longer bears the necessary causal relations for pain, according to functionalism, 
since it is no longer disposed to cause an action-planning process’ (p. 108). This is the 
conclusion of the first stage of the anti-FNTE argument: as of t2, φ has lost the functional role of 
pain. If so, then according to the FNTE Sam is no longer in pain – thanks simply to an 
incapacitation of an inactive part of his brain. 
Let me pause to address the worry that Antony’s argument is scientifically naïve. I foresee 
three specific concerns. 
Concern (i): the brain has no ‘pain region’ or ‘action-planning region’. We now know that 
pain has a highly distributed network of cerebral correlates, including in the thalamus, the insula, 
and the anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., Tracey & Mantyh 2007). And certainly action planning is 
not localized to a specific brain region; the main locus is the prefrontal cortex, which houses 
executive functions (e.g., Fuster 2008, Ch. 5), but other areas are also likely involved. However, 
Antony himself notes that his argument “does not assume that there is a single region of Sam’s 
brain where all pains occur, or that there are brain regions that subserve only pain, but only that 
each pain occurs some place or other”, and that the same goes for the ‘action-planning region’ (p. 
107n). The argument will run on any two brain regions, or even two sets of regions, that are 
sufficiently anatomically distinct that signals may be sent between them and that one region may 
be incapacitated while the other is not. Nothing about this is impossible. And if you think it’s 
impossible in the specific case of pain and action-planning, others could be substituted; pain and 
action-planning are simply examples. 
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Concern (ii): it is not possible to perform the required kind of anatomically specific and 
temporally precise neural incapacitation. Antony’s ‘impressive technology’ is certainly fiction 
for now. But it is not nomologically impossible. We can already shut down one hemisphere of 
the brain by injecting sodium amobarbital via the carotid artery, in what is known as the Wada 
test for hemispheric localization of language and memory functions. What Antony envisions is a 
more precise version of that. We can imagine delivering a drug into the brain that immediately 
alters the chemistry of the neurons within a defined range of the region of release so that they 
cannot carry action potentials. 
Concern (iii): it is an empirical matter whether the experience of pain would be cancelled (or 
even affected) by the incapacitation of knowledge of how to seek pain relief. It is crucial to see 
that this concern must be directed at the functionalist. A key point of my argument is that the 
FNTE entails some very bold empirical predictions. For if it is true, then the cancellation of a 
functional role entails the cancellation of any current experience for which that role is 
necessary. For example, the cancellation of the pain role, perhaps by incapacitating the ability to 
plan the acquisition of relief, should cancel (or at least reduce) the subject’s pain experience. I 
am questioning whether such predictions are plausible. Ideally, the answer would indeed be 
delivered empirically, by actually performing the sort of experiment Antony describes. But we 
currently lack the knowledge and technology to do this. As for existing research in cognitive 
neuroscience, it may be suggestive, but it will not supply a crucial test. For example, we might 
look at patients with prefrontal lesions that have impaired their executive functioning, and ask 
whether their ability to experience pain has been affected. I know of no studies indicating such 
an effect; but the functionalist might reasonably object that case studies, which are by their 
nature uncontrolled, are a poor test of her theory. She might also argue that cancelling just one of 
φ’s causal relations will not suffice to cancel φ’s realization of pain (see below); that is, that a 
wider set of lesions would be required. Of course, we are unlikely to find case studies in which 
just the right set of brain regions are damaged; and indeed we do not yet even know what the 
right set of brain regions would be. Therefore, at least for now, only in imagination can we carry 
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out the precise sort of neural manipulations that are called for. Empirical tests (if we decide they 
are worthwhile) must wait for the future. 
Let us return to Antony’s argument. As I have said, he focuses his defensive efforts on its first 
stage, which I described above. I can only sketch his points here. He considers and rebuts three 
specific ways of cashing out the most obvious objection, which is that canceling a single causal 
relation of φ could not cancel its entire realization of pain. The thrust of his rebuttals (see his §5) 
is that his case may be amended to involve canceling whichever causal relations, and however 
many relations, are deemed necessary to support the pain realization – by incapacitating not just 
aS, but many regions of Sam’s brain.1 For ease of exposition I shall proceed as if only aS is 
incapacitated, but it should be kept in mind that this restriction is not mandatory. 
Another objection can be motivated by an analogy of a kind that is common in the literature 
on dispositions. Imagine encasing a fragile vase very thickly in bubble-wrap so that it is safe 
from damage. We nevertheless think the vase retains its fragile disposition. Similarly, can’t the 
functionalist say that even though φ’s disposition to activate aS cannot be manifested, it still 
exists (since pS is intact)? However, Antony points out that this objection gets functionalism 
wrong. The view it suggests results in an explosion, and thus a trivialization, of functional roles. 
The functionalist would end up saying that anything could realize anything. As Antony says, for 
example, on that sort of view “the temperature of my coffee cup could realize pain, since it is 
disposed to cause an action-plan-construction” (p. 108n) – for if the cup were hooked up to the 
right sort of system components, its temperature would cause construction of an action plan (and 
whatever other effects are part of the pain role). Here is another way to put the point, which will 
also be important below. It is precisely in order to avoid this explosion of functional roles that 
                                                
1 Teleofunctionalist theories may have a way out. If functional roles are defined purely biologically, φ might keep its 
functional role even if all of its causal relations are cancelled. However, I do not know if any teleofunctionalists 
would actually adopt this view, for it seems to entail that φ would still realize pain if pS were removed from Sam’s 
brain, put in a jar, and artificially stimulated. This sort of result is usually regarded as anathema by functionalists. 
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functionalists hold that a mental state’s core realizer (in this case, activity φ in pS) is not 
sufficient for realizing the mental state (in this case, pain). Also necessary is a set of causal 
relations between the core realizer and various other brain states. The core realizer plus those 
other states compose pain’s total realizer (Shoemaker, 1981). The total realizer of Sam’s pain 
thus includes, we assume, aS’s readiness to be activated. So if aS is incapacitated, pS no longer 
has the disposition to activate aS. 
This ends my discussion of the first stage of Antony’s argument. Most readers will, I believe, 
be ready to accept the argument that far (and I commend Antony’s discussion to anyone with 
further doubts). Since the functional roles of mental states are commonly taken to supervene on 
the brain, it will not be controversial that interference in the right places in Sam’s brain would 
cancel the functional roles of his experiences, such as pain. What will be controversial, however, 
is the further claim that Sam’s experiences themselves could survive such interference. This is 
the burden of the second stage of the argument, which is my concern in this paper. 
In his argument’s second stage Antony must argue that Sam would, in fact, still be in pain 
after the incapacitation of aS. His defense of this claim is very brief. In the short third section of 
his paper, he says that it is supported by ‘an intuition – one to the effect that manipulating a 
system’s inactive or unused parts can have no effect on that system’s experience at the time of 
the manipulation’ (p. 113). 
This intuition is compelling. I myself find it deeply appealing.2 However, it will also attract 
some justified resistance. The resistance will be based on the countervailing intuition of the 
multiple realizability of the mental. It is widely held, especially (but not only) by functionalists, 
                                                
2 Maudlin (1989) gives an argument that relies on the same basic intuition (I discuss this argument in Bartlett 2012). 
However, he targets computational theories only, and says that functionalism is untouched. I am not sure Maudlin is 
right about this, but in any case the present paper tries to find another way of driving the argument home against 
functionalism. 
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that mental states can be realized by a variety of physical states. So why does the fact that aS is 
physically inactive show that it is extraneous to Sam’s pain experience? 
Antony’s response is to stand pat on his intuition. He says that describing the incapacitated 
brain region (in Sam, aS) as ‘inactive’, ‘unused’, or ‘inert’ suffices to secure his argument in all 
cases concerning ‘systems in which the realizations of conscious states and processes involve 
(neural) activity’ (pp. 113-114). He thus appears to assume that it is simply evident that neural 
activity, and only neural activity, realizes conscious experiences in humans. However, this is not 
evident. Antony himself admits that how humans’ experiences are realized is a contingent 
matter. But empirical evidence does not show that experience in humans is realized solely by 
neural activity. At best it shows that neural activity is necessary. 
Moreover, functionalists have principled reasons to dismiss Antony’s intuition. Functionalism 
views mental states as fundamentally relational. As I said earlier, causal relations between φ (the 
activity in pS) and various other brain states are what enable φ to occupy the pain role. φ is only 
the core realizer; the total realizer includes aS’s intactness. For the functionalist, then, aS is 
involved in realizing Sam’s pain, so of course incapacitating it would result in the pain state’s 
elimination. The fact that aS is inactive does not prevent it from standing in a causal relation; but 
the incapacitation disrupts the causal relation that constitutes the pain state. 
Now of course Antony need not accept the functionalist’s relational view of experiences. But 
equally, the functionalist need not accept Antony’s intuition that physically inert states cannot be 
part of the realization of experiences. At best we have a stalemate. 
In short, the anti-FNTE argument that Antony is attempting to provide still stands in need of 
its second stage. I propose to complete that stage of the argument in a way that works within the 
functionalist’s own conceptual apparatus of core and total realizers. My defense will rest on the 
claim that, given that the incapacitation of aS could not affect Sam’s immediate thoughts or 
behavior, it could not eliminate (or even modify) his experience of pain. 
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3. Introducing the Constraint on Experiential Change 
Central to my argument that Sam would remain in pain after the incapacitation of aS will be 
the following principle: 
The Constraint on Experiential Change. Given a subject S who is attending to a current 
conscious experience E, changes in E will cause immediate change in S’s dispositions to 
thought, affect, or behavior. 
The Constraint, as I shall call it for brevity, captures the idea that changes to one’s conscious 
experiences are able to immediately shape one’s thought, affect, or behavior (or all of these). It is 
not about what is constitutive of experiences. It does not say that changes in cognitive, affective, 
or behavioral dispositions are a necessary condition on experiential change. It says only that such 
changes in dispositions are caused by changes in attended experience. So the Constraint is a 
pretty weak constraint on the attribution of experiential change. I submit that an adequate theory 
of conscious experience must satisfy it. 
I have formulated the Constraint so as to skirt around doubts about the causal efficacy of 
experiences. It has been suggested that conscious experiences are merely epiphenomena of 
unconscious neural processes. Studies by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Daniel Wegner (2002) 
purport to show that we are conscious of some acts of will only after the decision to act has been 
made unconsciously. In a similar vein, studies of visual deficits such as blindsight and agnosia 
suggest that the visual system has two ‘streams’, and that we are conscious only of one of them 
even though it is the other that controls many of our behaviors (for a review, see Milner & 
Goodale, 2009). These claims are controversial. But even if they have merit, they do not show 
that all of our experiences are epiphenomenal. To the contrary, it seems clear that conscious 
experiences frequently shape our thought, affect, and behavior. Consider, for example, your 
ability to attend to your pain when your doctor asks you to rate its severity. In any case, certainly 
no functionalist will want to say that experiences are completely epiphenomenal, and so I shall 
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assume that they are not – at least in cases where the subject is actually attending to the 
experience. These are the cases to which the Constraint applies. 
The Constraint embeds two claims. The first is that changes in attended conscious experience 
cause changes in our cognitive, affective, or behavioral dispositions. The second is that such 
dispositional changes occur more or less immediately: the experiential changes alter our 
dispositions right away, as opposed to only at a later time (perhaps mediated by independent 
causal factors). It is convenient to discuss these two claims in reverse order. 
The second claim, that experiences can have immediate effects, is quite nicely captured by 
Michael Tye’s (1995, 2000) claim that conscious experiences are ‘poised’ to affect one’s beliefs 
and desires, and thus also one’s behavior;3 or Jesse Prinz’s recent claim that the function of 
consciousness is to “provide a menu for action” (2012, p. 203) by making available a range of 
options extracted from the current situation. Thus a splitting headache causes you to grimace and 
try to remember where the aspirin is. The sound of your dog barking causes you to wonder what 
is bothering him, and maybe to go and check on him. And so on. Of course, an experience will 
not always affect your actual thoughts, emotions, or behavior. The claim is only that it can do so. 
Perhaps if you are distracted then an experience might have no effect even on your dispositions 
to thought, emotion, or behavior. But such cases fall outside the scope of the Constraint. 
The Constraint’s first claim is that changes to one’s experiences bring about changes to one’s 
cognitive, affective, or behavioral dispositions. I stress that this is not intended as a conceptual 
truth. The primary evidence for it lies in everyday observation. First-person acquaintance with 
our own experiences indicates that distinct experiences tend to have distinct effects on thought, 
emotion, and behavior. Such informal observations are also supported by empirical research into 
the causal powers of experiences (e.g., Morsella 2005). 
                                                
3 But I do not endorse Tye’s claim that such poising is constitutive of experiences (see above). 
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The worry that some experiences may not be poised to affect thought, emotion, or behavior 
may be put aside if we focus on experiences that are central to the attention of a normal 
individual.4 I doubt there could be a change to an attended experience that did not immediately 
alter the subject’s cognitive, affective, or behavioral dispositions. 
In reply, some might appeal to Putnam’s (1963) ‘super-spartans’, who are trained to suppress 
all behavioral signs of pain: perhaps with even more training, they might be able to suppress the 
mental signs too, and not even think about the pain or have it change their mood. But (I reply) 
then they would fall outside the scope of the Constraint, for they would not be attending to the 
pain. And even if they were somehow still attending to it without thinking about it, they would 
not be without dispositions to think about (or act on) their pain. They would merely have trained 
themselves not to manifest those dispositions. 
A more realistic concern might point to phenomena such as inattentional blindness and 
change blindness. Simons and Chabris (1999) found that if subjects were asked to track how 
many times a basketball was passed by a team of players in a video, many subjects would 
completely fail to notice a person in a gorilla suit walking across the middle of shot. Rensink, 
O’Regan and Clark (1997) found that it was extremely hard for subjects to notice some major 
changes in an image – such as a central object disappearing – if the original and the changed 
version were flashed successively and repeatedly with a mask in between. Such results might be 
taken to show that our experiences can undergo radical changes without our even noticing. 
However, it is far from clear that this is the correct interpretation. It may be that subjects simply 
don’t experience the gorilla, or the object’s disappearance, at all. Or more conservatively, even if 
they do experience the gorilla or the disappearance on some level, there is no reason to think that 
they are also attending to it. Indeed there is every reason to think that they are not. Therefore, 
                                                
4 Of course, many will want to say that Sam is far from normal. I address this concern in §6. 
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such cases fall outside the Constraint’s scope. Certainly there is no positive reason to think that 
Sam’s situation is anything like that of the subjects in these studies. 
 
4. Preparation for the main argument: adapting the Sam case 
I now introduce two alterations to the Sam case. The first is simply that the pain causes him to 
grimace, and that he will keep grimacing until the pain lessens. The second alteration will be 
more controversial: it is that aS is not involved in causing the grimace. More specifically, I wish 
it to be the case that when aS is incapacitated at t2, Sam’s grimace is unaffected. 
You might be surprised that I call this alteration controversial. For isn’t it obvious that Sam’s 
grimace would not be affected by aS’s incapacitation? Grimacing is a natural and unplanned 
expression of pain. I agree, but I cannot use this as a reason for the alteration, because it is 
specific to this case. I have chosen the example of a grimace precisely because it seems unlikely 
to be causally connected to action planning. The functionalist is claiming that, insofar as aS’s 
intactness is a part of the total realizer of Sam’s pain (see §2), its incapacitation will end his pain 
experience. In turn, that strongly suggests that the effects of that experience will also be affected 
– and that goes for all of the effects of the experience. The grimace is simply one example. I am 
looking to construct an argument that will apply to all of them. Indeed, I want my argument to 
apply not just to any effect of a pain experience, but to any effect of any experience at all. So if I 
were to simply say that grimacing is unplanned behavior and thus not likely to be affected by the 
incapacitation of aS, that reason would not generalize, so it would not serve my purpose. I must 
give a reason for the second alteration that will apply in the general case. 
An analogy will help illustrate what I am proposing. Consider a car’s state of braking. The 
core realizer of that state will be a state of the brake system, which comprises the brake pedal, 
the pads, the discs and all the interconnections of these parts, including the master cylinder and 
brake lines. Call this system bC. The core realizer of the state of braking, then, is a certain active 
state of bC: minimally, the state of the pedal’s being depressed and the pads’ pressing against the 
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discs. Call that state β. Braking’s total realizer will further include states of other parts of the car: 
its wheels, for example, since β’s disposition to cause a slowing of the revolution of the wheels 
is constitutive of its being the core realizer of braking. Finally, a normal effect of braking is that 
the tail-lights illuminate – via a switch under the brake pedal which powers the tail-lights. 
(A terminological note: I shall refer to the parts of a total realizer that are outside its core 











Now although the disposition for the wheels to slow is constitutive of braking, and although 
braking normally causes the tail-lights to illuminate, the wheels play no part in causing that 
illumination. We could remove or incapacitate the wheels without changing the fact that state β 
causes the tail-lights to come on (Fig. 1b). I want to say that the situation in Sam is analogous 
(Fig. 1a). His grimace will be unaffected by the removal or incapacitation of aS, for aS plays no 
part in causing the grimace. This is by contrast with φ, the activation of pS. 
Of course, since the tendency to cause expressions of discomfort is part of pain’s functional 
role (though this is not important to my argument), the grimace no doubt requires the 
manifestation of some disposition that is part of pain’s total realizer. But this is no reason to think 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Sam’s realization of pain with a car’s realization of braking. 
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that the incapacitation of aS in particular would have to influence Sam’s grimace. For there is no 
reason why a part of the brain that subserves action-planning should be directly causally linked 
to facial expression – any more than a car’s wheels are directly causally linked to its tail-lights. If 
this reasoning is doubted in this particular case, we may switch to some other case (involving 
some other type of experience) where the equivalent premise is acceptable; but I shall proceed on 
the assumption that the present case is acceptable. 
My general claim, from which my second stipulation concerning Sam’s case is drawn, is that 
there will be some non-core elements of the realizer of a token experience, and some immediate 
cognitive, affective, or behavioral effects of that experience, which are such that those non-core 
elements will lack a direct causal link to those cognitive, affective, or behavioral effects. From 
this it follows that some case of the sort I am describing must be possible – that is, a case in 
which at least some of a token experience’s actual effects remain unchanged by the canceling of 
one (or more) of the experience’s non-core elements. Hence my stipulation that in the case at 
hand, some of the actual effects of Sam’s pain, in particular his grimace, are unchanged when aS 
is incapacitated. 
Let me now consider two objections to the general claim that I have just made. 
Firstly, someone might simply deny the claim. They might argue that an experience’s total 
realizer must include only states that can influence all of the experience’s typical effects, and 
then make an empirical bet that this criterion is met by states that are deemed (a priori) to be part 
of a given experience’s total realizer – such as the intactness of aS. 
However, while there may sometimes be a direct causal link between a non-core element of 
the realizer of an experience and a thought, emotion, or behavior caused by that experience 
(perhaps because the non-core elements physiologically overlap their associated core realizer), so 
that interfering with the former will inevitably affect the latter, there is no reason to think this 
will always (or even often) be the case. Moreover, the functionalist cannot rely on an empirical 
bet (cf. Antony p. 110n). Her theory is meant to apply to all nomologically possible sentient 
creatures; yet it is certainly possible that some such creatures will have experiences whose 
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realizers have non-core elements which have no direct causal link to some of the effects typical 
of the experience. 
Of course, if the disposition in question has actually manifested, then eliminating the relevant 
non-core element would have an effect. We would definitely alter Sam’s behavior if we 
incapacitated aS after he had begun to move toward the medicine cabinet! But not all of the 
dispositions associated with an experience will manifest every time the experience is tokened, so 
not all of its non-core elements will be causally active every time. Non-core elements must only 
support a disposition for the subject to think, feel, or act in a certain way; they need not actually 
cause the subject to think, feel, or act in that way every time the mental state is tokened. So 
unless a given non-core element is one whose supported disposition is actually manifesting, we 
may alter that element on that occasion without affecting the subject’s responses. So even if 
someone rejects my claim that Sam’s grimace is unaffected by the incapacitation of aS, a similar 
claim must still be accepted in a wide range of cases – and our argument can be re-run using one 
of those cases. The case of Sam’s pain causing his grimace is merely a representative example. 
The second objection to my general claim also starts with the assertion that an experience’s 
total realizer must include only states that can influence all of the experience’s typical effects; 
but then it proceeds differently from the first objection. A psychofunctionalist, who is willing to 
let empirical findings determine the functional roles of mental states, might say that if there turns 
out to be even one effect of Sam’s pain (like his grimace) that would be unaffected by aS’s 
incapacitation, then the intactness of aS is simply not part of the pain’s total realization. (By 
analogy, if the total realizer of braking includes only states that can influence all the effects of 
braking, then states of the wheels are ruled out, for they do not affect the illumination of the tail-
lights.) Accordingly, the incapacitation of aS would be irrelevant to the realization of Sam’s pain, 
for its intactness would not be part of the pain role. Any physical insult that did cancel a non-
core element of Sam’s pain experience would have to influence any and all typical effects of that 
experience – just as would an insult to the core realizer itself. Generalizing the objection: a case 
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like the one I am describing, involving a physical insult to a supposed non-core element of a pain 
experience but without influence on any of the pain’s typical effects, would be impossible. 
This cure, however, turns out to be identical to the disease it is meant to target. The proposed 
restriction on non-core elements is meant to derail my argument against the FNTE, but it actually 
just abandons the FNTE – because it entails that experiences may have no functional role. For it 
might turn out that for some experience E, the only state that has influence over all of E’s typical 
effects is its core realizer. Then according to the proposed restriction, E’s core realizer and its 
total realizer would be identical. But since an experience’s total realizer is sufficient for the 
experience itself, E’s core realizer would be sufficient for E itself. Hence E would have no 
typical causes and effects. No particular dispositions would be necessary for its realization. For 
example, pain might be realized simply by (e.g.) c-fiber activation, serving as core and total 
realizer all in one. Whatever causes and effects E had in one subject might not be duplicated in 
another. In short, E would have no functional role. Yet the FNTE asserts the nomological 
necessity of functional roles for experience. 
The problem I am identifying with this second objection, I emphasize, is not that the proposed 
restriction on the total realizers of experiences entails that there actually will be experiences 
whose core realizers exhaust their total realizers. (Though I suspect that the restriction does 
indeed have that entailment.) It is just that the restriction entails that such a case is possible. So 
the objection is self-defeating, because it denies the FNTE. 
This section has described the adapted version of the case of Sam that I need for my adapted 
argument, and defended the possibility of that version. I now present the argument itself. 
 
5. The main argument 
We are assuming that functionalists take the intactness of aS to be part of the total realizer of 
Sam’s pain experience. So they hold that Sam could not be in pain if aS were incapacitated, much 
as a car could not be braking if its wheels were immobilized. 
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This functionalist view does not sit well with the Constraint on Experiential Change. Sam’s 
pain is causing him to grimace. If his pain were to cease, or even just reduce in intensity, the 
Constraint says that this would cause an immediate change in his cognitive, affective, or 
behavioral dispositions. It is very likely, for instance, that his grimace would immediately cease 
or change in some way. Certainly, assuming that his new dispositions could be manifested, such 
a change would be (nomologically) possible. We would need an excellent reason to believe 
otherwise. Yet Sam’s grimace cannot immediately cease or change as a result of the 
incapacitation of aS, for aS has no direct role in causing the grimace. Only via some indirect path 
could the incapacitation affect Sam’s grimace (say, if it were replaced by a puzzled frown when 
he finds himself unable to remember how to get to his medicine cabinet, due to the incapacitation 
of aS). Hence, I argue, incapacitating aS cannot immediately affect his pain experience, for if it 
did then it would be possible for his grimace to change right away. So the intactness of aS is not 
necessary for Sam to be in pain; it is not part of his pain’s total realizer. 
I do not deny that experiences possess associated dispositions that on many instances do not 
manifest. What I deny is the FNTE, which implies that the dispositions themselves are necessary 
for the experience. I argue that since the presence or absence of those dispositions generally 
cannot causally influence an experience’s cognitive, affective, or behavioral effects, they are not 
necessary for the experience itself. Here, then, is the argument: 
(1) Incapacitating aS cannot immediately cause Sam to stop grimacing. 
(2) Eliminating Sam’s pain experience very likely would immediately cause him to stop 
grimacing. 
Therefore, 
(3) Incapacitating aS cannot eliminate Sam’s pain experience. 
Therefore, 
(4) Sam remains in pain after aS is incapacitated. 
Premise (1) was defended in §4. So I now turn to (2), which is supported by the Constraint. 
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6. Defense of premise (2) 
The functionalist may argue that eliminating Sam’s pain experience would not necessarily 
cause him immediately to stop grimacing, and hence that, contrary to (4), he might no longer be 
in pain after t2 – even though he continues to grimace as if he is. 
There are two positions available regarding how the grimace might be maintained after t2 in 
the absence of any pain experience. The first is that the grimace was actually not being caused by 
the pain experience even before t2, but by some other state, which remains after t2 even though 
the pain is gone. The second is that before t2 the grimace was caused by pain, but after t2 it is 
caused by some other, newly-obtaining state. 
The first option threatens to lead to the result that pain is epiphenomenal. Since our argument 
is not specific to pain’s causing of a grimace, one cannot escape it by just accepting that pain 
does not cause grimaces. Indeed, the argument is not even specific to the experience of pain, so 
nor can one escape it by accepting that pain lacks all causal powers. One would have to accept 
epiphenomenalism for all experiences generally. But functionalists are not amongst those who 
find epiphenomenalism palatable. For functionalists, after all, mental states are constituted by 
their causal powers. If experiences do not have causal powers then the objection mentioned by 
Levin (2010; see my §1) applies in spades: there cannot be a functional account of experience if 
experiences do not have functional roles! 
So functionalists will surely prefer the second option. By analogy, there are ordinary 
situations in which a grimace of pain might continue even if the pain itself ceases. A person 
whose toothache is now actually gone might keep grimacing out of a desire for sympathy, for 
example. The functionalist may suggest that something schematically similar happens to Sam at 
t2. Call the state brought about by the incapacitation of aS ‘schmain’. Before t2, Sam was in pain. 
But with the incapacitation, the cause of his grimace switches from pain to schmain. This story 
avoids epiphenomenalism, for Sam’s pain was causing his grimace before t2. 
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On this proposal the functionalist is holding that schmain, while similar to pain in its 
realization, is qualitatively distinct; it is not painful. It may even be an entirely non-experiential 
state. After t2, therefore, Sam is no longer in pain.5 
If this is so, however, why is he still grimacing? The Constraint implies that if pain and 
schmain were qualitatively distinct, it would be possible (and remember, we are dealing with 
nomological possibility) for them to have distinct effects. One of those effects would be on his 
grimace. (Remember, though, that Sam may also continue to evince pain in other ways, such as 
by saying that he is in pain. The grimace is just one example.) So if his grimace cannot possibly 
subside, we ought to conclude that Sam is still in pain after t2. 
The functionalist may object that we cannot apply the Constraint in this unusual context. 
Perhaps eliminating an experience in that way would not affect the subject’s thought, emotion, or 
behavior. After all, we lack empirical evidence about such cases, and the cognitive neuroscience 
literature is littered with novel brain lesions that had highly unexpected effects. 
Sam’s situation is indeed novel, so our judgment should be cautious. But if anyone is being 
incautious, it is the functionalist. Her current proposal entails a remarkably bold empirical 
conjecture. Let me explain. 
Remember first that Sam was not special. The functionalist must say that if we performed the 
same procedure on hundreds of subjects, none would cease grimacing when we incapacitated 
their brain’s action-planning region, despite the supposed fact that none are in pain after that 
time. 
                                                
5 The functionalist may say that the incapacitation of aS would not make Sam’s experience non-painful, but rather a 
different kind of pain. But in the final analysis this will not change the outcome of my argument. Firstly, as I shall 
explain, the main problem is the sheer implausibility of the idea that there could be a change in Sam’s experience 
with no possibility of his thoughts or behavior changing; and the implausibility of that idea is not much reduced if 
the experiential change is from one kind of pain to another, rather than from pain to non-pain. (Wouldn’t Sam be 
able to say that his pain experience had altered?) Secondly, there must be some set of non-core elements whose 
incapacitation would eliminate his pain entirely. So we may simply re-run the argument on that incapacitation. 
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More generally still, the functionalist’s current proposal applies to all types of experience 
(nociceptive, visual, tactile, etc). Her general claim runs as follows. Given a token experience 
which is causing a certain cognitive, affective, or behavioral response, that experience can be 
terminated by canceling one or more of its non-core elements (by incapacitating some part of the 
brain that supports those elements). 
Now, with that termination, one of two things must happen. Either (i) the response will 
immediately change (due to some direct causal link to the canceled element(s)); or (ii) the 
response will be unchanged. 
I noted in §4 that (i) may sometimes be the case, but that the functionalist cannot always or 
even often rely on it, for there is no reason to think that such direct causal links (e.g., between aS 
and Sam’s facial expression) are omnipresent or even common. So (ii) would have to be the case 
at least sometimes, and probably most of the time. Yet the idea that (ii) would be a common 
outcome of the imagined intervention is a remarkably bold empirical conjecture. It will not 
suffice just to say that the response (e.g., the grimace) will be unchanged because the canceled 
non-core element (e.g., aS) was not causally connected to it. For if that were the case, we would 
also expect – per the Constraint – that the cancellation would not change the experience (e.g., we 
would expect Sam to still be in pain). But the functionalist is claiming that canceling the non-
core element does change the experience. So we need an explanation of how the cancellation can 
do that without affecting the response. That is, the explanation for (ii) must explain both the 
unchanged response and the changed experience. 
Consider an example of the sort of speculative hypothesis that would explain how (ii) could 
be true in Sam’s sort of case. Perhaps the neural circuits that subserve action-planning play a role 
in mediating facial response, so that their incapacitation creates a dissociation which prevents a 
facial response to changes in nociceptive experience. This could be true. Yet the functionalist 
cannot stop with such a limited speculation. She must say that except for occasional cases in 
which (i) holds, a similar dissociation would be created by every incapacitation of a non-core 
element of any experience’s realizer in any subject – so that in no such case could the subject’s 
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thought, emotion, or behavior be altered, despite the experiential change. The sort of hypothesis 
that the functionalist would need is thus extremely broad: for example, that these sorts of cortical 
lesions always cause subjects to become unable to attend to their current experience (so that they 
do not immediately respond to the experiential change). I urge that such a hypothesis does not 
deserve to be taken seriously unless it has significant empirical motivation. 
The functionalist’s bet, then, is that the close causal tie between experience and the rest of our 
mental economy can be severed under a wide range of (hypothetical) circumstances involving 
precise and limited brain lesions, though she offers no explanation of how this severing would 
occur. By contrast, my bet is that in those circumstances, the causal tie would remain intact – 
simply because we know that it exists in normal cases, and because there is insufficient reason to 
suppose that it is severed in the cases under discussion. In the absence of a specific reason not to 
do so, I submit that we should infer from the general evidence supporting the Constraint to the 
conclusion that Sam remains in pain after t2. And that entails that the FNTE is false. 
 
7. Summary and conclusion 
I have endeavored to complete the anti-FNTE argument that was first offered by Antony 
(1994) by arguing that the FNTE violates a principle that we very justifiably believe about 
conscious experiences to which one is attending. That principle is that when one’s attended 
experience changes, one’s immediate cognitive, affective, or behavioral dispositions also change. 
The FNTE, by contrast, entails that there can be changes in your attended conscious experience 
which cannot affect those dispositions. I have argued that this is reason to reject the FNTE. 
Let me remind the reader that my argument shows that functional states are not nomologically 
necessary for experience. So the conclusion is not just that functionalism fails to solve the ‘hard 
problem’ (Chalmers 1995) of explaining how experience could arise from mere physical stuff. 
Some philosophers might hope that even if functionalism cannot solve that problem, it can still 
identify which states are, as a matter of fact, those in virtue of which we have experiences. 
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Chalmers himself promotes just such a ‘non-reductive’ functionalism. But my conclusion is that 
our experiences do not occur in virtue of our being in certain functional states, for the former can 
remain in the absence of the latter. So functionalism – and indeed any theory that adheres to the 
FNTE, which includes a number of theories that are not overtly functionalist, such as many 
representational theories – fails even as a non-reductive theory of experience. 
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